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Abstract 
We use a new firm-level dataset to examine the efficiency of investment in emerging economies.  
In the three-year period following stock market liberalizations, the growth rate of the typical 
firm’s capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 5.4 percentage points.  
Cross-sectional changes in investment are significantly correlated with the signals about 
fundamentals embedded in the stock price changes that occur upon liberalization.  Panel data 
estimations show that a 1-percentage point increase in a firm’s expected future sales growth 
predicts a 4.1-percentage point increase in its investment; country-specific changes in the cost of 
capital predict a 2.3-percentage point increase in investment; firm-specific changes in risk 
premia do not affect investment. 
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1. Introduction 
Do the investment decisions of firms in emerging economies reflect information about 
the fundamentals of those firms?  On the one hand, there is little reason to expect an affirmative 
answer to this question, because stock price movements in emerging economies generally do not 
convey much firm-specific information (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000).  If managers in emerging 
economies make investment decisions in accordance with changes in stock prices, but the prices 
contain little information about the underlying firms, then investment will also be divorced from 
firm-specific fundamentals. 
On the other hand, the firm-specific information contained in stock prices tends to rise as 
countries move towards greater capital market openness (Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung, 2004).  
And, with few exceptions, emerging economies continue to move rapidly in that direction (Stulz, 
1999, 2005).  For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several developing countries 
liberalized their stock markets, allowing foreign investors to purchase shares for the first time.  
Moreover, when these liberalizations occur, publicly traded firms in the liberalizing countries 
experience large stock price changes, and firm-specific fundamentals help to explain much of the 
cross-firm variation in price changes (Chari and Henry, 2004).  
Since liberalization-induced stock price movements do contain information about firm-
specific fundamentals, it is natural to ask whether those fundamentals have predictive power for 
investment.  In this paper, we examine whether the real investment decisions of firms in 
emerging economies respond to the changes in fundamentals implicitly signaled by the 
liberalization-induced stock price changes of those firms.   
In a rational asset pricing world, a change in a firm’s stock price reflects a change in 
either or both of the following: (1) the firm’s cost of capital, and (2) the firm’s expected future 
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profitability.  In theory, stock market liberalization affects only the cost of capital, and it does so 
through two channels.  The first is a common shock to all firms in the economy—a fall in the 
risk-free rate as the country moves from financial autarky to integration with the rest of the 
world.  All else equal, the common shock to the cost of capital will increase the average 
investment rate of all firms.   
The second channel is a firm-specific “beta” effect.  With liberalization, the relevant 
benchmark for pricing the risk of individual stocks switches from the local stock market index to 
a world market index.  Consequently, the equity-risk premium falls for firms whose returns are 
less correlated with the world market than they are with the local market and vice versa.  Given 
the common shock, the firm-specific shock implies that firms whose equity premia fall should 
invest even more than those whose premia rise. 
While in theory stock market liberalizations primarily affect the cost of capital, in 
practice they often coincide with other economic reforms that increase total factor productivity, 
economic growth, and the profitability of investment (Henry, 2000a, 2003).  Therefore, it is 
important to control for the possibility that reform-induced changes in expected future 
profitability may drive any post-liberalization changes in investment.  We use a simple open-
economy model of Tobin’s Q to decompose firms’ post-liberalization changes in investment 
into: (1) changes in expected future profitability, (2) the change in the risk-free rate, and (3) 
changes in equity premia.  We then use the cross sectional variation in our five-country, 369-firm 
data set to identify the economic and statistical significance of each of the three effects. 
Panel data estimations show that a one-percentage-point rise in our measure of a firm’s 
expected future profitability results in a 2.9- to-4.1-percentage-point increase in the growth rate 
of the firm’s capital stock, depending on the specification.  The common shock to firms’ cost of 
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capital is also important, as it generates a 2.3-percentage-point per-year increase in capital stock 
growth and is statistically significant in almost every specification.  In contrast, firm-specific 
changes in equity premia have an economically trivial effect on changes in investment and are 
statistically insignificant in every specification. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 explains the contribution of 
our paper relative to previous work.  Section 2 presents a simple model that generates testable 
empirical predictions.  Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive findings.  Section 4 
outlines the empirical methodology and presents the main results.  Section 5 presents robustness 
checks.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Related Literature 
Broadly speaking, previous work expresses two views about the wisdom of opening 
capital markets in emerging economies to foreign investors.  The first view argues that 
liberalization promotes efficient resource allocation.  Removing restrictions on international 
capital movements permits resources to flow from capital-abundant developed countries, where 
expected returns are low, to capital-scarce emerging economies, where expected returns are high.  
In theory, the flow of resources into the capital-scarce countries should reduce their cost of 
capital, increase investment, and raise output (Fischer, 2003; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; 
Summers, 2000).   
The second view sees the first as unsubstantiated.  This view asserts that instead of 
promoting a more efficient international allocation of capital, liberalizations generate speculative 
capital flows that are divorced from the fundamentals and have no discernible effect on 
investment, output, or any other real variable with nontrivial welfare implications (Bhagwhati, 
3 
1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999, 2002).  
Recent work in finance tries to resolve the difference of opinions by examining the 
economic impact of stock market liberalizations.  For example, previous work uses aggregate 
data to document three central facts.  When countries liberalize their stock markets: (1) the cost 
of capital falls (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry 2000a; Martell and Stulz, 2003); (2) aggregate 
investment booms (Henry, 2000b); and (3) the growth rate of GDP per capita increases (Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad, 2004; Levine, 2001).   
While aggregate data provide some support for the view that liberalization leads to a 
more efficient allocation of capital, they have at least two shortcomings.  First, it is not clear how 
much confidence we can have in an empirical result that attributes an economy-wide investment 
boom to stock market liberalization, a policy change that directly affects only those firms listed 
on the stock market.  Since the link from liberalization to growth works through investment, it 
too, must be treated with skepticism (Henry, 2003).  Second, the rise in aggregate investment 
may suggest an efficient reallocation of capital between countries, but it says nothing about the 
efficiency of capital allocation within countries.  Questions about within-country allocative 
efficiency cannot be answered with aggregate data that, by definition, provide no within-country 
variation in investment.   
This paper addresses the first shortcoming by using firm-level data.  Instead of using 
aggregate investment as a proxy for the investment of the firms affected by liberalization, we use 
the investment of only those firms that are listed on the stock market.  Since publicly traded 
firms are impacted directly by liberalization, our data provide a tighter link to the theory than 
aggregate investment data.   
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The paper addresses the second shortcoming by developing a new identification strategy.  
Again, observing an increase in aggregate investment following liberalizations does not tell us 
whether markets are efficiently allocating capital within a country.  The key idea is that the stock 
price changes that occur upon liberalization embody signals about firm-specific fundamentals 
such as the cost of capital and expected future cash flows.  While recent evidence confirms that 
the stock price changes that occur during liberalizations do contain such firm-specific 
information (Chari and Henry, 2004), the more pressing economic question is whether 
investment responds accordingly.  The next section of the paper develops a simple model that 
allows us to address the question in a systematic fashion.  
 
3.  A Simple Model of Firm-Level Investment, Stock Prices, and Liberalization 
This section generates empirically testable, cross-sectional predictions about 
liberalization, firm-level investment, and firm-specific information.  It does so by analyzing what 
happens to the desired investment of an all equity-financed firm when the country in which that 
firm resides moves from a regime where foreigners are not permitted to own domestic shares, 
and domestic residents cannot invest abroad, to one where all stocks are fully tradable.1
On the financial side, we make the usual assumptions under which the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) holds.  On the real side, we assume a standard neoclassical production 
framework: All firms are price takers, the production function is linear homogeneous in capital 
and labor, and the cost of installing capital is linear homogeneous in I and K.  Under these real-
side assumptions, marginal Tobin’s Q and average Q are equal (Hayashi, 1982).  Finally, for 
expositional convenience, assume that all investors have an identical coefficient of relative risk 
                                                 
1 The central intuition of the analysis extends to the case of non-symmetric liberalizations.  See Chari and Henry 
(2004) for details. 
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aversion, γ .  The frictionless capital markets framework highlights the key margins at which 
liberalization affects firms’ investment decisions, but the empirical analysis in Section 4C.1 
considers financial frictions. 
Consider the standard investment equation for a firm in a small country in autarky: 
(1)      i
i
I a bQ
K
⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Since marginal and average Q are equal by assumption,  may be expressed as iQ i
i
V
K
 where  is 
the stock market value of the firm and is the replacement cost of its capital stock.  Since  is 
simply the present discounted value of the firm’s expected future cash flow, let 
iV
iK iV
iπ%  denote the 
firm’s stochastic cash flow, which is expected to grow exponentially at the rate  so that: ig
(2)     [ ]i ii i i i i
VQ
K K r g
π
θ= = + −  
Where r is the economy’s risk-free interest rate, iπ  the expected value of iπ% , and θi the risk 
premium investors require to hold shares of firm i in equilibrium.   
Now suppose that the country opens its stock market to the rest of the world and also 
allows its residents to invest abroad.  Interest rates, risk premia, and expected future growth rates 
may all change instantaneously in response to the news.  Let , *r *iθ and  be the post-
liberalization values of those fundamentals.  Note that the stock of capital, , adjusts more 
slowly because it takes time to buy and install new machines.  Hence, define “on-impact” as a 
period of time that is long enough for asset prices to adjust to liberalization but too short for the 
capital stock to do so as well, and let  denote the on-impact value of Q for firm i.  The on-
impact change in Q will drive the subsequent adjustment in the firm’s capital stock.  Since Q has 
*
ig
iK
*
iQ
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changed, the capital stock must also adjust to reestablish equilibrium. 
Specifically, the liberalization-induced change in the firm’s desired investment, which we 
denote 
*
i
I
K
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , must equal .
*
iQΔ 2  This implies that: 
(3)      
*
*
i
i
I b Q
K
⎛ ⎞Δ = Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Combining (2) and (3) and performing a few steps of algebra shows that the relationship between 
the post-liberalization change in investment and the on-impact change in Q may be written as: 
(4)    ( ) ( ) (* * **i i i i i i
i
I Q r r g g
K
λ θ θ⎛ ⎞ )*⎡ ⎤Δ = Δ = − + − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  
where ( )( )* **ii i i i i i
b
K r g r g
πλ θ θ= ⎡ ⎤+ − + −⎣ ⎦
.  Since the pre- and post-liberalization risk premia 
( iθ  and *iθ ) are not directly observable, so it takes one more step of algebra to deliver an 
empirically testable equation. 
Recall that under the CAPM, ,{ ( ) / ( )}i i M MCov R R Var R Rθ = M , where the variable MR  is 
the excess return on the domestic market portfolio, MR  its expected value, and  
the historical covariance of firm i’s stock return with the local market.  Similarly, 
( , )i MCOV R R
*
,{ ( ) / ( )}i i W WCov R R Var R Rθ = W
)]
                                                
, where the subscript W indexes the world market portfolio.  
Using these definitions and the fact that the excess return on the market is equal to the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion times the variance of the market return, a little algebra reveals that 
.  So we can write , where * [ ( , ) ( ,i i i M i WCOV R R COV R Rθ θ γ− = − *i i DIFCOVθ θ γ− =
 
2Adjustment costs may deter firms from installing capital until Q returns to its pre-liberalization level, but the on-
impact change in Q will still drive the direction and magnitude of the change in the capital stock. 
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DIFCOV =[ .   ( , ) ( , )]i M i WCOV R R COV R R−
Finally, using the definition of DIFCOV we may rewrite equation (4) as 
(5)             ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−++−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ 48476
444 3444 21
EarningsofRateGrowthinChange
ii
CapitalofCostinChange
ii
i
ggDIFCOVrr
K
I **
*
γλΔ . 
The iλ  term in front of the brackets on the right-hand-side of (5) is a firm-specific 
scaling factor with some technical implications for empirical estimation, which we discuss in 
Section 4.  The three terms inside the brackets merit discussion now because they provide 
testable predictions by highlighting the forces that drive the reallocation of capital. 
The first term is the common shock, .  It shows that the post-liberalization change 
in investment depends on the change in the risk-free interest rate.  All else equal, investment will 
rise if , the world risk-free rate, is lower than , the autarky rate, and vice versa.  Importantly, 
the common shock term has no subscript, because it has the same effect on all firms in the 
economy.   
*(r r− )
*r r
The second term is the firm-specific risk sharing effect ( ).  Firm-specific 
changes in investment should vary inversely with firm-specific changes in the equity premium.  
When a liberalization occurs, it alters the set of systematic risks faced by the representative 
investor.  This means that the relevant benchmark for pricing the risk of individual stocks 
switches from the local stock market index to a world market index.  Consequently, liberalization 
reduces the equity premium for firms whose returns are more correlated with the local market 
than they are with the world market, and vice versa.  Given the first term, the second implies that 
high  firms will experience a larger fall in their cost of capital than low  
firms.  All else equal, firms that experience a larger fall in their cost of capital will also invest 
iDIFCOV
DIFCOV DIFCOV
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more.  In other words, while liberalization reduces the risk-free rate, and all firms should invest 
more on average, we should observe even larger increases in investment by firms whose shares 
become less risky to hold in the aftermath of liberalization. 
The third term in equation (5), , indicates that the larger the increase in the 
growth rate of a firm’s expected future cash flow, the greater its post-liberalization change in 
investment.  Now, as the previous three paragraphs explain, if stock market liberalization affects 
resource allocation, it does so primarily through its impact on the cost of capital.  Nevertheless, 
liberalizations coincide with important economic reforms such as trade liberalizations and 
inflation stabilization programs (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Henry, 2002).  In other words, post-
liberalization changes in investment may stem from a fall in the cost of capital (driven by stock 
market liberalization) or an increase in profitability (driven by other reforms).  The next section 
turns to the data we employ to address these issues. 
*( i ig g− )
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Findings 
 
This section introduces the data.  Subsection 3A explains how we use the data to 
construct the variables we need to test the predictions of the model in Section 1.  Subsection 3B 
presents descriptive findings: basic facts in 3B.1, time series facts in 3B.2, and cross-sectional 
facts in 3B.3. 
Estimating equation (5) requires data on capital stock growth rates, cash flow growth 
rates, and covariances of stock returns.  We obtain firm-level data on capital stocks, cash flows, 
and stock returns from the International Finance Corporation’s Corporate Finance Database.  
Singh et al. (1992) and Booth et al. (2001) provide exhaustive descriptions of this database.  Our 
discussion focuses on the details relevant to this paper. 
Between 1980 and 1994, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) collected annual 
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balance sheet and income statement data for a maximum of the 100 largest publicly traded, non-
financial firms in eleven developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.  The IFC employed two screening criteria 
in deciding the sample of countries for its database: (1) quality data had to be available for a 
reasonably large sample of firms; and (2) developing countries from each continent had to be 
represented.  For several countries the sample begins after 1984, because the early years did not 
contain data of sufficiently high quality. 
In order for a country in the IFC database to be included in our sample, it must satisfy 
one additional criterion: The IFC data for that country must exist before and after the year in 
which the country liberalized its stock market.  To identify the date of each country’s first stock 
market liberalization we employ the same procedure as Henry (2000a).  Official policy decree 
dates are used when they are available.  When no policy decree dates are available, we employ 
two indirect methods.  First, the establishment of the first country fund permitting foreign 
ownership.  Second, a 10-percent increase in the IFC’s investability index; the index captures the 
ratio of the market capitalization of stocks that foreigners can legally hold to total market 
capitalization.  Table 1 lists the liberalization dates for the five countries in the sample. 
The before-and-after criterion, in combination with the short length of some countries’ 
time series, reduces our sample to 369 firms spread across five countries: India, Jordan, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand.  Despite its modest size, this sample of firms is better suited to 
addressing the question of whether liberalization affects firms’ investment decisions than 
competing databases such as Worldscope and Global Vantage.  The reason is that Data from 
Worldscope and Global Vantage do not satisfy the before-and-after criterion.  The median stock 
market liberalization date in the sample is 1988 (see Table 1), and Worldscope and Global 
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Vantage contain little firm-level data before that time. 
 
4A. Constructing Measures of Capital Stocks, Profitability, Covariances, and Tobin’s Q  
The IFC database provides balance sheet information that we use to construct a time 
series on the growth rate of each firm’s capital stock.  For each firm, the database reports the 
nominal value of net fixed assets (the stock of property, plant, and equipment less depreciation) 
on an annual basis.  In order to obtain the real growth rate of each firm’s capital stock, the ideal 
adjustment procedure would deflate the percentage change in net fixed assets (NFA) by the rate 
of inflation of each firm’s capital goods.  Since no such capital goods data exist, we deflate using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in three steps.  First, we take the natural log of nominal NFA at 
time t+1 and subtract the natural log of NFA at time t.  Second, we take the natural log of the 
CPI at time t+1 and subtract the natural log of the CPI at time t.  Third, we subtract the second 
quantity from the first to produce the real growth rate of each firm’s capital stock between year t 
and t+1.   
The database also contains income statement information that we can use to construct 
measures of the growth rate of expected future profitability.  Specifically, we have to choose 
whether to use earnings or sales.  We choose sales for the following reason.  The data on 
earnings exhibit wild year-to-year fluctuations.  In comparison, the sales growth numbers are 
relatively stable.  Since sales revenues are relatively stable, the fluctuations in earnings suggest 
either: (1) implausibly large year-to-year fluctuations in unit costs; or (2) that firms manipulate 
their earnings numbers.  In light of concern about point (2), and since firms have less incentive to 
manipulate sales than they do earnings, we feel more comfortable using sales.  Having said that, 
using sales as a measure of profitability has some important limitations that we discuss in 
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Section 4.  We divide the nominal value of each firm’s sales by the CPI to create a real index. 
The IFC database also contains annual stock return data, which we use to compute the 
variable DIFCOV.  Recall that DIFCOV is the historical covariance of a firm’s stock return with 
the local market index, minus the historical covariance of the firm’s stock return with the world 
market index.  Since the goal is to relate changes in investment—an annual variable—to changes 
in risk, we compute annual covariances.  For each firm we compute the covariance of its annual, 
real-dollar-denominated, dividend-inclusive return with that of the local market.  For each firm 
we also compute its annual, real-dollar-denominated, dividend-inclusive return with that of the 
MSCI World Total Return Index.  Monthly covariances are notoriously fraught with 
measurement error (Fama and French, 2004).  The signal-to-noise ratio in our annual covariance 
data is even lower.  Section 4B.1 attempts to address the measurement error problem, and the 
conclusion explains why, in spite of measurement error, it is important to test whether changes in 
the cross-section of risk explain changes in the cross-section of investment.   
For each firm in the sample, we also construct Tobin’s Q.  For the numerator we use the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt (current and long-term liabilities). 
We use book values of debt because the IFC database does not contain information on market 
values.  In the absence of data on market values of debt, some U.S. studies convert book values 
to market values by capitalizing net interest payments using the yield on Moody’s corporate A 
bond (Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993).  Because we do not have data on corporate bond 
rates in these countries for the relevant time period, we cannot use such a conversion method.  
For the denominator of Tobin’s Q we use the book value of total assets.   
The level of Tobin’s Q may not be directly comparable across countries, because of 
differences in accounting practices.  For example, firms in India, Malaysia, and Jordan value 
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assets using the practice of fair-market valuation in accordance with North American Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  In contrast, Korea and Thailand rely on strict historic-
cost accounting as in Germany and Japan.  In light of these differences, changes in Q provide 
more compatible cross-country measures.  We examine changes in Q in the next subsection. 
 
4B. Descriptive Findings 
Table 1 summarizes the essential characteristics of the data.  Column 1 provides country 
names.  Column 2 lists the year of each country’s stock market liberalization.  Column 3 gives 
the number of firms in each country.  Column 4 shows that the stock market capitalization of the 
369 firms in our sample constitutes about 40 percent of the total stock market capitalization of all 
publicly traded firms in these countries.  This number suggests that the firms account for a non-
trivial fraction of total economic activity, but the point should not be overstated; publicly traded 
firms account for a smaller fraction of the economy in these countries than they do in the U.S.   
 
4B.1 Preliminary Facts About Liberalization, Changes in Q, and Changes in Investment 
The fifth and final column of Table 1 shows that the average firm experiences a 46.1-
percent jump in the value of Tobin’s Q during liberalization, but this fact merits further scrutiny.  
As mentioned earlier, we only have information on the book value of debt.  Since liberalization 
has no impact on book values, it follows mechanically that changes in the market value of 
equity—stock prices—must drive the jump.  To confirm that this is indeed the case we repeat the 
calculation in Column 5 using stock prices instead of Tobin’s Q.  This second calculation is 
consistent with the first.  The average firm experiences a 51-percent jump in its stock price 
during the liberalization year. 
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The jump in stock prices confirms a central prediction of the model in Section 2.  The 
logical next issue is whether investment responds accordingly.  This raises two questions.  The 
first is time series in nature: Do we see a rise in the average investment rate of the firms in our 
sample?  The second is cross-sectional:  Is the size of the increase in investment positively 
correlated with the size of the stock price jump, that is to say, do the firms that experience the 
largest increase in stock prices also experience the largest increase in investment?  The next two 
subsections address each of these questions in turn. 
 
4B.2 Time Series Findings 
Figure 1 provides a preliminary answer to the time series question.  It plots the average 
growth rate of the 369 firms’ capital stocks in liberalization time: t=[0] is the year in which 
liberalization occurs, t=[+1] is the year immediately following the liberalization, and so on.  The 
figure shows that the average firm’s investment rises sharply in the three years immediately 
following a liberalization.3  Figure 1 is not entirely surprising since previous work documents 
that aggregate investment increases in the aftermath of liberalizations (Henry, 2000b).  But 
previously published work uses aggregate (country-level) data, which consists of investment by 
both publicly traded and non-publicly traded firms.  Since liberalization most directly affects the 
investment incentives of publicly traded firms, the firm-level effects documented in this paper 
appear more tenable.   
Moreover, as one would expect, the firm-level effects are also larger.  For instance, the 
growth rate of the average country’s capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an 
average of 1.1 percentage points per year in the three years after liberalization (Henry, 2003).  In 
                                                 
3 Consistent with this finding, Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000) document a rise in capital intensity of 
production for widely held firms after liberalization in Canada. 
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contrast, Figure 1 shows that the growth rate of the average firm’s capital stock exceeds its pre-
liberalization mean by an average of 3.8 percentage points per year over the same time period.  A 
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates the economic significance of the firm-
level numbers.  Multiplying the firm-level capital-stock-growth deviation number, 3.8, by the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital (about one-third), gives a rough sense of its implication 
for the growth rate of firm output: about 1.3 percentage points per year. 
It is important to remember that stock prices sometimes deviate from their fundamental 
values (Shiller, 1981, 2000).  Ramping up investment in response to a stock price bubble can 
hardly be called efficient in a social welfare maximizing sense.4  In order to assess whether 
liberalization fosters inefficient investment, we examine the ex-post rate of return to capital.  For 
each firm, we compute the flow return to the stock of capital as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to the value of net fixed assets.  After computing this ratio for each of the 369 
firms, we take a simple average and call it the rate of return to capital. 
Figure 2 shows that the rate of return to capital actually increases from an average of 16.0 
percent per year in the pre-liberalization period (years -3 to –1) to 24.3 percent per year in the 
post-liberalization period (years +1 to +3).  While Figure 2 appears inconsistent with the notion 
of indiscriminate, bubble-driven investment, we would expect to see some decline in capital’s 
rate of return as firms buy and install new machinery.  Why does this not happen?  Again, 
liberalizations may coincide with reforms that increase the profitability of investment.  Figure 3 
demonstrates the point.  The growth rate of real sales and real earnings both increase sharply 
during liberalization episodes. 
                                                 
4 See Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), Fischer and Merton (1984), and 
Stein (2003) for an extensive discussion of efficient investment when stock prices deviate from fundamentals. 
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4B.3 Cross-Sectional Findings 
There is no glaring evidence of inefficiency in the time series profiles of investment and 
the fundamentals.  Yet for firms to invest efficiently, they must be discerning not only in the time 
series but also in the cross section.  In turn, cross-sectional efficiency requires that firms’ post-
liberalization investment decisions systematically reflect the signals about fundamentals that are 
embedded in the stock price changes that occur at liberalization.   
Before providing a preliminary answer to the cross-sectional question—are changes in 
investment correlated with the changes in stock prices?—it is useful to review the rationale for 
raising the question in the first place.  The paper began with the observation that liberalization-
induced stock price changes contain firm-specific information and proposed to investigate 
whether that information affects firms’ investment decisions.  Specifically, the goal is to 
decompose the correlation between changes in investment and the liberalization-induced stock 
price changes into something more fundamental: the correlation between changes in investment 
and the changes in discount rates and profitability that drive the stock price changes.   
As a first step, we examine the simple correlation between the changes in firms’ 
investment and their stock price change at liberalization (standard errors in parentheses; adjusted 
R-Squared=0.01; N= 1185):    
(6) 
it
I
K
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  = 0.001 + 0.056 , iSTOCKPRICECHANGE { }[0],[ 1],[ 2],[ 3]t∈ + + +  
                            (0.012)  (0.014).  
As before, the variable t indexes liberalization time.  The variable 
it
I
K
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  is defined as the 
growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus the average pre-liberalization growth rate of 
firm i's capital stock.  The pre-liberalization average is calculated over the three-year period 
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immediately preceding the liberalization (t=[-3] to t=[-1]).  The rationale for this construction is 
straightforward.  Just as the stock price response to liberalization is a measure of news, analyzing 
firms’ investment responses to that news requires a measure of the unexpected or abnormal 
growth rate of their capital stock relative to some benchmark.  All else equal, in the instant 
before news of liberalization arrives, the pre-liberalization mean of the growth rate of a firm’s 
capital stock is a reasonable forecast of its expected future growth rate.  The variable 
 is the liberalization–year percentage change in firm i's stock price. STOCKPRICECHANGE
The low value of R-squared indicates a lot of unexplained variation and might be 
interpreted as evidence of inefficiency, but it is important to remember that the principal 
objective of empirical work is to obtain dependable estimates of the true regression coefficients, 
not to achieve high values of R-squared (Gujarati, 1988, p. 186).   
Bearing the caveat about R-squared in mind, equation (6) provides reasonable support for 
the theory.  On average, the larger the impact of liberalization on a firm’s stock price, the larger 
is its post-liberalization increase in investment.  A simple calculation illustrates the economic 
significance of the correlation.  As mentioned earlier, the average value of the liberalization-year 
stock price changes in our sample is 51 percent, so equation (6) predicts that the growth rate of 
the average firm’s capital stock will exceed its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 2.9 
percentage points (51 percent times 0.056) in the post-liberalization period.  Again, the 
implication of this estimate for output growth is not small—about one percentage point per year.   
While both the time series and the cross-sectional data suggest the empirical relevance of 
the question with which the paper began, the evidence presented so far is only preliminary.  
Again, neither Figure 1 nor equation (6) control for a host of factors, other than liberalization, 
that may drive the increase in investment.  The next section addresses this subject.  
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5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
This section explains the empirical methodology and presents results.  Subsection 4A 
presents the benchmark results.  Subsection 4B takes a closer look at the role of the cost of 
capital in the results, and 4B.1 re-estimates the results using alternative measures of firm-specific 
changes in risk.  Subsection 4C examines why changes in risk do not affect investment, and 4C.1 
examines the potential impact of imperfect capital markets on the results.  
The following equation from Section 2 shows how to decompose the post-liberalization 
changes in investment into the fundamentals that drive them:   
(7)  ( ) ( )* **i i
i
I r r DIFCOV g g
K
λ γ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤Δ = − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ i i . 
The symbols inside the brackets show how the change in investment for each firm depends on 
the common shock of a change in interest rates (the intercept term) and changes in risk sharing 
and expected future growth rates (the slope terms).   
The iλ  term in front of the brackets is a firm-specific scaling factor that has some 
technical implications for empirical estimation.  If the iλ ’s were observable, we could transform 
the terms in brackets to yield an equation with constant coefficients.  Since the iλ ’s are not 
observable, it might seem natural to estimate equation (7) with a random coefficients model that 
takes them into account.  The problem with random coefficients estimation is that it requires time 
variation in all of the right-hand-side variables and DIFCOV is purely cross-sectional.  Since we 
cannot estimate (7) using random coefficients, and subsequent robustness checks (Section 5) 
show that ignoring the scale effect is inconsequential, we begin by estimating the following 
panel regression: 
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(8)   0j i
ijt
I CONSTANT COUNTRY a SALESGROWTH
K
⎛ ⎞Δ = + + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ jt  
3
1
1
ijta SALESGROWTH ττ +=
+ Δ∑ 0 ijtb DIFCOV ε+ + , { }[0],[ 1],[ 2],[ 3]t∈ + + + . 
Equation (8) provides a practical regression specification that captures all of the 
qualitative features present in the structural decomposition of equation (7).  The variable 
ijt
I
K
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  denotes the deviation of the capital stock growth of firm i (in country j) from its firm-
specific mean.  Again, t denotes years measured in liberalization time, as defined in Section 
3B.2.  For instance, 
[ 1]ij
I
K +
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  denotes the deviation, in the year following liberalization, of the 
growth rate of firm i’s capital stock from its firm-specific mean.  The intercept term, 
CONSTANT, measures the average value of the common shock to the cost of capital, after 
controlling for the country-specific effects captured by the dummy variable,C . OUNTRY
The variable  is the deviation of the growth rate of firm i’s sales 
from its firm-specific mean in year t.  It is our best proxy for “news”—changes in the growth rate 
of expected future profits.  Just as the left-hand-side variable captures the “surprise” or abnormal 
change in capital stock growth, the sales variable captures the abnormal growth in sales.  To 
control for the impact of current abnormal growth on investment we use the variable 
.  In theory, only changes in expected future growth should affect 
investment, but including changes in current growth proves useful when we examine the validity 
of the perfect capital markets assumption in Section 4C.1.  To control for the impact of future 
abnormal growth on investment we use the sum of three leads of abnormal growth.  For instance, 
when t=[0], the summation variable takes on the value of cumulative abnormal growth in Years 
ijtSALESGROWTHΔ
ijtSALESGROWTHΔ
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[+1], [+2], and [+3].  It bears repeating that the sales growth variables control for shocks to 
current and expected future growth, whether they originate from economic reforms coincident 
with stock market liberalization or elsewhere.   
The next term on the right-hand-side of (8) is the variable , which captures the 
impact of firm-specific changes in risk.  Recall that DIFCOV is defined as the difference 
between the firm’s historical covariance with the local and world markets.  Even though 
DIFCOV does not vary over time for any given firm, it does vary across firms for any given time 
period.  Equation (8) uses this cross-firm variation in DIFCOV for any given time period to 
estimate the effect of changes in risk.  Equation (8) also estimates the effect of changes in 
expected profitability by making use of both the time series variation in sales growth within a 
firm, and the cross-sectional variation in sales growth across firms.  To see this, simply note that 
the change-in-sales-growth variable has both a firm and a time subscript.   
DIFCOV
Turning at last to the error term, ijtε , it is important to note that since all firms in a given 
country are “clustered” around the same liberalization date, the correlation between individual 
firms’ capital stock growth rate deviations may not be zero.  If this is the case, the standard 
distributional assumptions about the error term, ijtε , no longer obtain.  Accordingly, all of the 
regressions we estimate adjust for clustering in the computation of standard errors.  The 
estimation procedure also corrects for heteroscedasticity across firms.   
 
5A.  Benchmark Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (8).  Column (1) reports the 
regression of changes in capital stock growth on a constant (the common shock), country-fixed 
effects, and no other controls.  The coefficient on the constant is 0.041 and significant at the one-
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percent level.  This means that in the post-liberalization period, the growth rate of the typical 
firm’s capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 4.1 percentage points 
per year. 
Column (2) reports the results of a regression on a constant and changes in current and 
future sales growth.  The coefficient on changes in current sales growth is 0.229 and significant 
at the one-percent level.  The coefficient on changes in future sales growth is 0.315 and also 
significant at the one-percent level.  Both estimates are also economically significant.  For 
instance, the estimate on changes in current sales growth indicates that a 10-percentage-point 
deviation of current sales growth from its pre-liberalization mean predicts that the typical firm’s 
capital stock growth in the post-liberalization period will exceed its pre-liberalization mean by 
2.29 percentage points (0.1 times 0.229).  Again, the estimate of the constant, 0.019, is 
economically and statistically significant. 
Column (3) reports the results of a regression on a constant and our measure of changes 
in risk sharing.  The estimate of the constant in this specification is 0.028 and is significant at the 
one-percent level.  The coefficient on changes in risk sharing is positive, as predicted by the 
theory, but it is statistically insignificant, and economically trivial.  To see what trivial means, 
multiply the coefficient on changes in risk sharing (0.037) by the average value of the variable 
for all the firms in the sample (0.015).  This calculation shows that the average annual effect of 
risk sharing on the typical firm’s capital stock growth is 0.00056 or 0.056 percentage points, 
which means that the effect on firm output growth is roughly 0.019 percentage points per annum.  
Column (4) reports the results of the full-blown decomposition, a regression of changes 
in capital stock growth on a constant, changes in sales growth, and changes in risk.  The constant 
is not significant in this regression.  The estimate of the coefficient on the change in current sales 
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is 0.316, the coefficient on the change in future sales is 0.287, and both are significant at the one-
percent level.  The estimate of the coefficient on changes in risk continues to be economically 
and statistically insignificant. 
 
5B.  Does the Cost of Capital Matter for Changes in Investment?  
While the estimated effect of changes in risk on changes in capital stock growth is 
economically trivial and statistically insignificant, the constant is meaningful and significant in 3 
of the 4 regressions in Columns (1) through (4) of Table 2.  The significance of the constant 
suggests that the common shock to the cost of capital affects the post-liberalization changes in 
investment.  Having said that, interpreting a significant constant as the impact of the common 
shock is not straightforward.  In theory, the constant captures the change in the risk-free rate as 
the country moves from closed to open capital markets.  In practice, the constant might reflect 
the impact of an unobserved regime shift that has nothing to do with a change in the cost of 
capital. 
In order to scrutinize whether changes in the cost of capital really matter, Column (5) of 
Table 2 reports the results of a regression that adds one more variable to the regression reported 
in Column (4).  The additional variable is one we used in the preliminary cross-sectional analysis 
in Section 3B.3: the firm’s stock price change during the liberalization year.  The logic of this 
regression is as follows.   Theory says that changes in stock prices are driven by changes in 
expected future profitability and changes in the cost of capital.  Since we are controlling for 
changes in profitability with changes in current and future sales growth, a significant coefficient 
on the change-in-stock-prices variable would suggest a significant effect of the cost of capital on 
investment. 
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Column (5) shows that the coefficient on the change in stock prices is 0.030 and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  This is a smaller number than the simple univariate coefficient 
on stock price changes in Equation (6), but it is still economically significant and suggests that 
firms’ post-liberalization changes in investment are significantly related to changes in their 
overall cost of capital. 
It is also important to note that the constant is no longer significant in the specification 
reported in Column (5).  If the significant constant in columns (1) through (3) reflects some 
spurious regime shift in investment that is unrelated to a change in the cost of capital, then the 
constant should not be affected by the inclusion of the change in stock prices as a right-hand-side 
variable, but this is not the case.  To underscore the point, Column (6) reports the results from a 
regression of changes in capital stock growth on a constant and the change in stock price with no 
other controls.  Again, the coefficient on the stock price change is significant, the constant is not. 
To confirm that changes in risk play no role in guiding the post-liberalization allocation 
of investment, Column (7) of Table 2 reports the results of a final specification.  We regress 
capital stock growth deviations on a constant, current sales growth deviations, future sales 
growth deviations, changes in risk, and changes in stock prices.  The coefficient on the change in 
stock price is 0.042 and significant at the one-percent confidence level.  The coefficients on 
current and future sales growth deviations are both significant at the one-percent level.  The 
coefficient on changes in risk remains economically and statistically insignificant.  
 
5B.1  Alternative Measures of Changes in Risk 
After controlling for expected future sales growth, stock prices matter for investment in 
almost every specification.  Yet, the evidence so far suggests that changes in risk sharing have a 
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negligible impact.  The unavoidable conclusion would seem to be that if changes in the cost of 
capital do drive investment, the common shock to the cost of capital matters far more than firm-
specific changes in risk premia.  But it is possible that the significance of risk sharing is masked 
by measurement error. 
One source of measurement error arises for the following reason.  When countries 
liberalize, some publicly listed firms become eligible for foreign ownership (investible), while 
others remain off limits (non-investible).  Data from the IFC’s Emerging Markets Database show 
that DIFCOV robustly explains the change in the cost of capital for investible firms, but is never 
significant for the non-investible ones (Chari and Henry, 2004).  Therefore, it is possible that the 
changes in investment are significantly correlated with DIFCOV for the investible firms, but the 
relation is masked because the investible and non-investible firms are grouped together in our 
sample. 
The investible and non-investible firms are grouped together in our sample, because the 
IFC Corporate Finance Database—the source of all the capital stock data—does not identify 
investible and non-investible firms.  The Emerging Markets Database (EMDB) distinguishes 
between investible and non-investible firms, but it contains no capital stock data.  By using the 
information in the EMDB, we were able to identify 61 investible and 28 non-investible firms in 
the IFC Corporate Finance database.  We then reconducted the entire battery of tests for risk 
sharing on this sample of 89 firms.  Again, the coefficient on DIFCOV did not reach 
significance. 
Returning to the full sample, we conducted three additional tests for evidence that 
changes in risk affect changes in capital allocation.  First, we constructed a new risk-sharing 
variable called DIFCOV1 using the growth rate of real earnings instead of stock returns.  Risk-
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sharing is defined here as the annual historical covariance of firm i’s real earnings growth with 
the aggregate growth rate of real earnings on the local market, minus the annual historical 
covariance of firm i’s real earnings growth with the aggregate growth rate of real earnings on the 
S&P 500.  Second, we sorted the firms by the sign of DIFCOV.  Firms for whom DIFCOV is 
greater than zero we label DIFCOVPOSITIVE; firms for whom DIFCOV is less than zero we 
label DIFCOVNEGATIVE.  Third, we ranked the firms in descending order of the magnitude of 
DIFCOV.  Firms in the top 20 percent of the distribution we label DIFCOVHIGH; those in the 
bottom 20 percent we label DIFCOVLOW.  After constructing our new risk-sharing variables, 
we replicated the regressions in Table 2 using the new measures in place of DIFCOV.  None of 
the three new variables produced significant results. 
 
5C.  Why Do Changes in Risk Have No Impact on the Allocation of Capital? 
 The failure of changes in risk to matter for the allocation of physical capital might 
suggest a “numb” (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) invisible hand incapable of responding to the 
signals about risk embedded in the liberalization-induced stock price changes.  But an alternative 
explanation is that firms face financial constraints that hinder their ability to allocate capital in 
accordance with the neoclassical model of investment.  In order to understand whether financing 
constraints affect the investment decisions of the firms in our sample, we take a closer look at the 
sensitivity of their investment to measures of current cash flow.   
 
5C.1 Imperfect Capital Markets 
In a frictionless capital market world, only expected future cash flow should matter for 
investment.  There is ample evidence, however, that current cash flow also exerts a significant 
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influence (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, 1998).  Furthermore, the results in 
Table 2 show that the post-liberalization decisions of firms in our sample are strongly influenced 
by current profitability.  One possible explanation for this fact runs as follows: The growth rate 
of sales that occurs at liberalization is unusually large (Figure 2), and this positive shock to 
profitability provides firms a cash windfall with which to finance projects that they could not 
implement in the pre-liberalization period.   
In order to further scrutinize the relation between investment and current sales evident in 
Table 2, we examine whether the correlation between investment and current sales growth during 
liberalization episodes is stronger than the correlation at any generic point in time.  Specifically, 
we estimate the following regression: 
(9)  1j ijt
ijt
I CONSTANT COUNTRY SALESGROWTH
K
β⎛ ⎞ = + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    
 2 *ijt ijt ijtSALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATIONβ ε+ + .  
In equation (9) the variable t denotes calendar time, not liberalization time as in all of the other 
regression specifications.  Accordingly, the left-hand-side variable is the growth rate of the real 
capital stock, not deviations of the growth rate from the mean as in equation (8).  Similarly, the 
right-hand-side variable is the growth rate of current sales, not deviations of the growth rate from 
its mean.  The reason for not using deviations is that equation (9) attempts to estimate the 
behavior of investment over the entire sample (not just the post-liberalization period) and 
deviations from the mean over the entire sample will, by definition, be equal to zero.  If the 
responsiveness of investment to sales growth at a generic time, t, is the same as when t is a 
liberalization year, then the coefficient on the interaction term should not be significant. 
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Table 3 presents the results.  The regression in Column (1) shows that both the coefficient 
on current sales growth and the interaction of current sales growth with the liberalization dummy 
are significant.  The regressions in Columns (2) through (6) show that only the interaction term 
with current sales growth is significant.  The question is how to interpret the finding that 
investment is particularly sensitive to current sales growth during liberalization periods. 
If a firm faces financing frictions then investment will be sensitive to current cash flow.  
Importantly, the converse of the preceding statement need not be true.  A firm’s investment may 
be sensitive to cash flow, even in the absence of financial constraints that impede its ability to 
implement optimal investment decisions (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Stein, 2003).  A 
number of models can account for the significant relation we find between investment and 
current profitability, and an attempt to distinguish between all of the competing explanations lies 
beyond the scope of this paper.5  Instead we ask the question most germane to the task at hand: 
Is there any evidence that a lack of access to external finance impedes the investment decisions 
of the firms in our sample?  While access to external finance would not seem to be an issue for 
the 100 largest manufacturing firms in a country—large established firms with lots of tangible 
assets tend to have access to credit—we examine several variables that speak directly to the 
issue.6
Begin with dividends.  A firm that pays dividends could invest more by cutting 
dividends, so it seems unlikely that a dividend-paying firm suffers from capital rationing (Lang 
and Stulz, 1994).  All of the firms in our sample pay dividends.  Furthermore, Row 1 of Table 4  
shows that a significant increase in dividend issuance takes place following liberalization, and it 
seems unlikely that capital-constrained firms would increase dividends at the very moment 
                                                 
5 See Stein (2003) for a review of the literature on capital market imperfections and corporate investment. 
6Our analysis of access to external finance is similar in spirit to that of Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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investment opportunities are improving (as Figures 2 and 3 suggest they are).  Next, turn to debt.  
All of the firms in our sample have long-term debt, which again does not suggest a lack of access 
to external finance.   
To provide a more general picture of the extent to which the firms in our sample use 
external sources to finance investment, Table 4 lists several indicative variables: dividends, long-
term debt, total external finance, retained earnings, and equity.  We construct the ratio of the 
change in each variable to the change in the stock of net fixed assets (investment).  We then 
calculate the average value of the ratio before liberalization, the average value after 
liberalization, and test whether the difference between the two averages is statistically 
significant.  Table 4 shows that reliance on external finance rises in the aftermath of 
liberalizations, but not significantly so.  Furthermore, there is a significant increase in reliance on 
internal funds. 
Taken together with the evidence on the impact of current and future sales growth, the 
evidence in Table 4 suggests that the firms in our sample increase investment when future 
growth prospects improve, but they also increase investment when they have a lot of cash.  These 
findings are roughly consistent with what we know about the investment behavior of firms in 
developed countries (Stein, 2003).  Again, sorting through all of the alternative explanations of 
these facts lies beyond our ambit.  The central point is that while financial constraints are surely 
an issue for some firms in the countries we study, there is no glaring evidence that a lack of 
access to external finance severely impedes the investment decisions of the 369 firms in our 
sample. 
Having shown that lack of access to external finance cannot explain why firms’ 
investment decisions are insensitive to changes in risk, we turn to other issues of robustness.  
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6.  Robustness Checks 
This section performs several robustness checks.  First, we explore whether the 
benchmark results in Table 2 are robust to the firm-specific scale effects mentioned in Section 4.  
Next, subsection 5A examines whether the panel regression estimations overstate the t-statistics 
on the stock price change coefficient.  Finally, subsection 5B tests whether the results are 
sensitive to the definition of investment deviations. 
The results in Table 2 do not adjust for the firm-specific scale effects we mentioned in 
Section 4.  In order to examine the consequences of not doing so, we re-estimate a subset of the 
results using the following random coefficients specification: 
 
(10) 
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Equation (10) differs from the benchmark specification, Equation (8), in two important ways.  
First, Equation (10) does not include changes in risk or any other purely cross-sectional variable 
on the right-hand-side, because random coefficients estimation requires time variation.  Second, 
the coefficient on future sales growth deviations, , is now firm-specific. ia
Random coefficients estimation calculates the coefficient on future sales growth 
deviations using a two-step procedure.  The first step adjusts for firm scale effects in the 
following fashion.  For a given firm, the random coefficients procedure uses the time variation in 
the future sales growth variable to generate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
coefficient.  This coefficient measures the firm-specific effect of future sales growth deviations 
on investment.  The first step is then repeated for each firm in the sample.  The second step uses 
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all of the firm-specific OLS estimates to create a single estimate of the effect of the right-hand-
side variable on investment.  It does so by using the iλ ’s from equation (5) to generate a 
weighted average of the firm-specific OLS coefficients. 
If scale effects are important, then the estimates of the coefficient on the future sales 
growth variable using the random coefficients procedure should differ substantially from the 
earlier estimates that do not adjust for scale effects.  This is not the case.  The earlier estimate 
(Column (2) of Table 2) produces a coefficient on future sales growth deviations of 0.315 that is 
significant at the one-percent level, and a constant of 0.019 that is significant at the five-percent 
level.  The random coefficients procedure produces a coefficient on future sales growth 
deviations of 0.167 that is significant at the one-percent level, and a constant of 0.015 that is 
significant at the five-percent level.   
 
6A.  Are the Standard Errors on the Stock Price Change Variable Understated? 
While the results in Table 2 may be robust to random coefficients estimation, another 
potential concern is that the standard errors for the coefficient on the stock price change variable 
may be too low.  To see the point, recall that the left-hand-side variable, firm-level investment, 
displays both cross-sectional and time series variation.  In contrast, the stock-price-change 
variable is purely cross-sectional.  Consequently, the panel regression framework estimates the 
coefficient on the stock-price change by repeatedly using the single observation of the stock 
price change for a given firm to match each time series observation of that firm’s investment in 
the post-liberalization period.  The potential problem with this procedure is that it effectively 
treats each repeated use of the stock price change as an independent observation.  Consequently, 
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the standard errors for the coefficient on the stock price change may be too small and the t-
statistics too large.  
To address this concern, Table 5 collapses the panel regression into a purely cross-
sectional regression with time-series averages for the post-liberalization change in investment on 
the left-hand side.  The results in Table 5 closely mirror those in Table 2.  Post-liberalization 
changes in investment continue to be explained by changes in current and future sales growth 
and the common shock to the cost of capital.  The effect of changes in risk remains insignificant.  
Of particular interest are the results reported in column (6), which confirm that liberalization-
induced stock price changes have a significant effect on investment; column (7) shows that the 
coefficient on the stock-price-change variable remains significant in the full-blown 
decomposition.  
 
6B.  Are the Results Sensitive to the Definition of Investment Deviations? 
Finally, it is also important to examine whether our measure of capital stock growth 
deviations is sensitive to the choice of the pre-liberalization window.  If countries liberalize in 
response to crises or recessions, then using the three years immediately preceding the 
liberalization as a benchmark may overstate the abnormal growth rate of the capital stock in the 
post-liberalization period.  Table 6 replicates all of the results in Table 2 using a new left-hand-
side variable, which is defined as the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus its 
average growth rate in the entire pre-liberalization period.  The results in Table 6 are very similar 
to those in Table 2.  The coefficients on current and future sales growth deviations are always 
significant, the constant and the coefficient on the stock price change during the liberalization 
year are often significant, and changes in risk never matter. 
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7.  Conclusion 
Since there is little evidence to suggest that levels of expected stock returns in the US 
vary cross-sectionally according to the degree of firms’ exposure to aggregate covariance risk, 
testing the hypothesis that firms in developing countries allocate physical investment in 
accordance with the CAPM may seem to fly in the face of all common sense.  However, new 
evidence suggests that changes in firm-level stock returns during stock market liberalization 
episodes do reflect changes in covariance risk (Chari and Henry, 2004).  And while the stock 
price changes that occur during liberalizations may convey information about changes in risk 
sharing, the more pressing economic question is whether investment responds accordingly.  
Because liberalizations reduce firms’ risk premia, they should also encourage them to implement 
some projects that were too risky to adopt in autarky, a lá Obstfeld (1994).   
We provide the first test of this prediction using firm-level data.  The expression for the 
change in a firm’s cost of capital, ρ , demonstrates why the data are not supportive: 
(11)     ( )*i ir r DIFCOVρ γΔ = − + . 
Suppose that liberalization reduces the risk-free rate by 10 percentage points and that γ, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2.  Since the average value of the change in a firm’s 
covariance ( in our sample is 0.015, the average firm-specific change in the cost of 
capital will be about 3 percentage points (2 times 0.015).  These numbers imply that the total fall 
in the cost of capital is 13 percentage points, but that the common shock accounts for roughly 80 
percent of the change. 
)DIFCOV
This simple numerical example illustrates a fundamental point.  If the common shock 
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dominates firm-specific shocks, then in order to detect a cross-sectional relationship between risk 
sharing and investment, changes in covariance must be precisely measured.  Since changes in 
covariance are not precisely measured, the simple explanation of measurement error may 
account for our results.  On the other hand, if the problem is not measurement error but that 
firms’ capital allocation decisions are truly insensitive to risk, then Morck, Yeung, and Yu’s 
(2000) result on the synchronicity of asset price movements in emerging markets may extend to 
synchronicity of real investment. 
Yet it seems hard to argue that firm-specific information is entirely irrelevant for 
investment when the market allocates capital in accordance with various firm-specific proxies for 
changes in profitability.  Furthermore, the common shock does help explain the post-
liberalization increases in investment, and there is some evidence to suggest that it signifies a 
change in the cost of capital.  Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the evidence, it brings 
us a step closer to understanding whether investment is efficiently reallocated when countries 
remove barriers to international capital flows.  Applied to better data in the future, the firm-level 
identification strategy developed here may bring us yet nearer. 
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Figure 1. Liberalization and The Growth Rate of Firms' Capital Stocks
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Figure 1.  Capital stock growth is the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus the average growth rate of firm i's capital in the entire period preceding 
the liberalization (t = [-1,-5]).  The y-axis measures the average growth rate of the capital stock across the firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in 
terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1,-5] is the pre-liberalization period and t = [+1,+3] is the post-liberalization period. 
 
Figure 2.  Liberalization and The Rate of Return to Firms' Capital 
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Figure 2.  The y-axis represents E/K which is the average rate of return to net fixed assets or the aggregate rate of return to capital.  For each firm, we compute 
the flow return to the stock of capital as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the value of net fixed assets.  E/K represents the average of this ratio 
across the 369 firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1, -3] is the pre-
liberalization period and t = [+1, +3] is the post-liberalization period. 
38 
 Figure 3.  Liberalization and the Growth Rate of Firms' Sales and  Earnings
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Figure 3.  Sales and earnings growth are the first difference of the log of sales and earnings for any given firm.  The y-axis measures the average growth rate of 
sales and earnings across the firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1, -3] is 
the pre-liberalization period and t = [+1, +3] is the post-liberalization period. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Liberalization Year 
 
 
 
Number of Firms 
 
Market Capitalization 
of Firms as a Fraction of 
Total Market Capitalization 
 
Percentage Change 
in Tobin’s Q During 
Liberalization Year  
      
India 
 
1992 99 0.25 81.5 
Jordan 
 
1987 35 0.14 9.6 
Korea 
 
1987 89 0.38 57.7 
Malaysia 
 
1987 85 0.45 -28.5 
Thailand 
 
1988 61 0.66 95.9 
Full Sample 
 
1988* 369 0.40 46.1 
Notes:  Column 2 contains the liberalization date for each country in our sample; the liberalization dates are taken from Henry (2000a, 2000b, 2003).  
“*” represents the median liberalization year in our sample.  Column 3 gives the number of firms in each country.  Column 4 presents the fraction of 
total market capitalization that the firms in our sample represent as a fraction of total market capitalization in the respective countries.  The total 
market capitalization represents the value of all publicly traded companies on the domestic exchange in the liberalization year.  Column 5 reports the 
percentage change in Tobin’s Q in the liberalization year.  For the numerator of Tobin’s Q we use the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of debt (current and long-term liabilities) and for the denominator we use the book value of total assets.     
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Table 2.  Panel Estimations: The Impact of Changes in Firm-Fundamentals on Post-Liberalization Changes in Investment. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
        
CONSTANT   0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.028***
(0.011) 
-0.0003 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
0.0004 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(.011) 
        
[0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ   0.229*** 
(0.047) 
 0.316*** 
(0.047) 
0.213*** 
(0.048) 
 0.268*** 
(0.048) 
        
3
1
ijtSALESGROWTH ττ +=
Δ∑   0.315*** (0.029) 
 0.287*** 
(0.032) 
0.344*** 
(0.032) 
 0.339*** 
(0.033) 
        
DIFCOV   0.037 
(0.195) 
-0.027 
(0.177) 
  -0.069 
(0.184) 
        
iSTOCKPRICECHANGE      0.0298** 
(0.015) 
0.057***
(0.016) 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
        
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.088 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.12 
        
Number of Observations. 1293 1292 1080 1079 1184 1185 1054 
Notes: Table 2 presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark regression, which is given by the following equation:  
   0 [0]j ij
ijt
I
CONSTANT COUNTRY a SALESGROWTH
K
Δ = + + Δ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3
1
1
ijta SALESGROWTH ττ +=
+ Δ∑ 0 ijtb DIFCOV ε+ + , { }[0],[ 1],[ 2],[ 3]t ∈ + + + .  The left-hand-
side variable ( )
ijt
I
K
Δ  denotes the deviation of the capital stock growth of firm i (in country j) from its firm-specific mean where t denotes years measured in 
liberalization time.   is the deviation of the growth rate of firm i’s sales from its firm-specific mean in year [0].  [0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ
3
1
ijtSALESGROWTH τ
τ
+
=
∑ Δ is 
cumulative abnormal growth rate in firms i’s sales  in Years [+1], [+2], and [+3].   is the difference between the  historical covariances of firm i’s 
returns with the local and world  markets.  
i
is the percentage change in firm i’s real stock price during the liberalization year.  
iDIFCOV
STOCKPRICECHANGE jCOUNTRY  
represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects.  All specifications control for clustering in the error structure.  The symbols 
(***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.  Panel Estimates of Sales Growth-Investment Elasticities During Liberalization Years. 
 
Right-Hand-Side Variables 
  
(1) 
  
(2) 
  
(3) 
  
(4) 
  
(5) 
  
(6) 
             
ijtSALESGROWTH   0.3072***
(0.0186) 
   0.1593***
(0.015) 
   0.1084***
(0.016) 
 01239*** 
(0.015) 
             
*ijt ijtSALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION   0.0555* 
(0.0302) 
   0.1788***
(0.027) 
   0.2085***
(0.028) 
 01899*** 
(0.0288) 
             
( 1)  ij tSALESGROWTH +
*ij t ij tSALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION+ +
ij tSALESGROWTH +
   0.1004***
(0.0177) 
 0.1158***
(0.0154) 
     01499*** 
(0.016) 
             
( 1) ( 1)     0.0316 
(0.0301) 
 -0.021 
(0.028) 
     -00559 
(0.0303) 
             
( 2)         0.0491** 
(0.021) 
 0.0579***
(0.0164) 
 0.070*** 
(0.016) 
             
( 2) ( 2)*ij t ij tSALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION+ +        0.0141 
(0.034) 
 -0.0386 
(0.035) 
 -0.0547 
(0.0311) 
             
Constant  0.0648***
(0.006) 
 0.1064***
(0.005) 
 0.0919***
(0.005) 
 0.1117***
(.006) 
 0.1035***
(0.005) 
 0.0862***
(0.005) 
             
R-squared  0.13  0.03  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.08 
Notes: Table 3 presents results for the response of current investment to contemporaneous and future lags of sales growth, which is given by the following equation:  
1j ijt
ijt
I
CONSTANT COUNTRY SALESGROWTH
K
β= + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ 2 *ijt ijt ijtSALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATIONβ ε+ + .  is measured as the first difference 
of the log of contemporaneous sales for any given firm over the entire sample period.  ) and )  measure the first and second leads 
of the growth rate of sales which is defined as the first difference of the log of sales.   is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the 
liberalization year and the three years following it.  All interactions terms between the SALESGROWTH variables and the liberalization dummy measure the change in the 
elasticity of the investment response to sales growth during the liberalization window.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
ijtSALESGROWTH
( 1ij tSALESGROWTH + ij tSALESGROWTH +( 2
ijtLIBERALIZATION
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Table 4.  Pre and Post Liberalization Measures of Firms’ Access to External Finance 
 
 
 
Variable 
  
 
Pre-Liberalization 
Average 
 
 
Post-Liberalization 
Average 
 
Post-Liberalization 
Average Differs From 
Pre? 
     
Change in 
Dividends/NFA 
 0.0336 0.0525 Yes*** 
     
Change in Long-term 
liabilities/change in NFA 
 0.521 2.222 No 
     
Change in External 
Finance1/Change in NFA 
 0.237 1.357 No 
     
Change in External 
Finance2/Change in NFA 
 1.192 1.285 No 
     
Change in Retained 
Earnings/Change in NFA 
 0.516 1.534 No 
     
Change in Internal 
sources/NFA 
 0.015 0.080 Yes* 
 
     
Change in equity/change 
in NFA 
 0.363 1.026 No 
Change in dividends/NFA is the first difference of the log of the ratio of dividends divided by net fixed assets for each firm.  External Finance1 for 
each firm is the sum of long-term liabilities and net worth less retained earnings.  Change in external finance1 is the first difference of the log of 
external finance1 for each firm.  Change in NFA is the first difference of the log of net fixed assets for each firm.  External Finance2 for each firm 
is the sum of total liabilities and net worth less retained earnings.  Change in external finance2 is the first difference of the log of external finance2 
for each firm.  Change in retained earnings is the first difference of the log of retained earnings or total reserves for each firm.  Internal sources is 
earnings after taxes less dividends paid for each firm.  Change in internal sources/NFA is the first difference of the log of internal sources to net 
fixed assets for each firm.  Equity is paid in capital or net worth less retained earnings.  All changes are calculated on an annual basis for each firm.  
Pre-liberalization average is the average for any given variable across firms and countries for the period t=-3 to t=-1.  Post-liberalization average is 
the average for any given variable across firms and countries for the period t=0 to t=+3. 
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Table 5.  Panel Estimations: The Impact of Changes in Firm-Fundamentals on Post-Liberalization Changes in Investment. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
        
CONSTANT   0.14***   
(0.047)  
0.065 
(0.048) 
0.097* 
(0.048) 
0.018 
(0.049) 
-0.048 
(0.062) 
0.003   0.062 -0.049 
(0.058) 
        
[0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ   0.152 
(0.132) 
 0.317*** 
(0.127) 
0.091 
(0.136) 
 0.221* 
(0.130) 
        
3
1
ijtSALESGROWTH ττ +=
Δ∑   0.369*** (0.064) 
 0.386*** 
(0.069) 
0.452*** 
(0.074) 
 0.456*** 
(0.075) 
        
DIFCOV   0.176 
(0.898) 
-0.303 
(0.887) 
  -0.551 
(0.881) 
        
iSTOCKPRICECHANGE      0.093 
(0.074) 
0.188***   
0.074 
0.121* 
(0.067) 
        
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.085 0.001 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.15 
        
Number of Observations. 377 360 322 306 331 346 298 
Notes: Table X presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark cross-sectional regression, which is given by the following equation:  
   0 [0]j ij
ij
I
CONSTANT COUNTRY a SALESGROWTH
K
Δ = + + Δ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3
1
1
ija SALESGROWTH ττ =
+ Δ∑ 0 ijtb DIFCOV ε+ + .  The left-hand-side variable ( )
ij
I
K
Δ  denotes 
the sum of the deviations of the capital stock growth of firm i (in country j) in the liberalization year and the three years following it from its pre-liberalization 
firm-specific mean.   is the sum of the deviation of the growth rate of firm i’s sales from its pre-liberalization firm-specific mean in the 
liberalization year.  
[0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ
3
1
ijSALESGROWTH τ
τ =
∑ Δ is cumulative abnormal growth rate in firms i’s sales  in  the three years following liberalization.   is the 
difference between the  historical covariances of firm i’s returns with the local and world  markets.  is the percentage change in firm i’s real 
stock price during the liberalization year.  
iDIFCOV
i
STOCKPRICECHANGE
jCOUNTRY  represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects.  All specifications 
control for clustering in the error structure.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 6.  Robustness Checks: Panel Estimations Using an Alternative Definition of Post-Liberalization Changes in Investment. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
        
CONSTANT 0.038***
(0.009) 
0.0138 
(0.008) 
0.021**
(0.010) 
-0.0003 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
        
[0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ   0.281*** 
(0.046) 
 0.316*** 
(0.047) 
0.266*** 
(0.047)  
 0.312*** 
(0.047) 
        
3
1
ijtSALESGROWTH ττ +=
Δ∑   0.329*** (0.027) 
 0.289*** 
(0.032) 
0.344*** 
(0.032) 
 0.329*** 
(0.034) 
        
DIFCOV   -0.016 
(0.186) 
-0.0273 
(0.177) 
  -0.044 
(0.177) 
        
iSTOCKPRICECHANGE      0.021 
(0.014) 
0.046***
(0.015) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
        
Adjusted R-Squared 0.00 0.099 0.002 0.095 0.10 0.01 0.11 
        
Number of Observations. 1293 1292 1080 1079 1184 1185 1054 
Notes: Table 6 presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark regression using an alternative measure of the post-liberalization change in investment:   
0 [0]j ij
ijt
I
CONSTANT COUNTRY a SALESGROWTH
K
Δ = + + Δ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3
1
1
ijta SALESGROWTH ττ +=
+ Δ∑ 0 ijtb DIFCOV ε+ + , { }[0],[ 1],[ 2],[ 3]t ∈ + + + .  The left-hand-side 
variable ( )
ijt
I
K
Δ  here denotes is defined as the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus its average growth rate in the entire pre-liberalization period.  
 is the deviation of the growth rate of firm i’s sales from its firm-specific mean in year [0].  [0]ijSALESGROWTHΔ
3
1
ijtSALESGROWTH τ
τ
+
=
∑ Δ is cumulative abnormal growth rate in 
firms i’s sales  in Years [+1], [+2], and [+3].   is the difference between the  historical covariances of firm i’s returns with the local and world  markets.  
is the percentage change in firm i’s real stock price during the liberalization year.  
iDIFCOV
i
STOCKPRICECHANGE jCOUNTRY  represents a set of country specific dummies that control for 
country fixed effects.  All specifications control for clustering in the error structure.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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